diff --git a/Cargo.lock b/Cargo.lock
index 7d575147f0..61d75b5d19 100644
--- a/Cargo.lock
+++ b/Cargo.lock
@@ -16200,6 +16200,7 @@ dependencies = [
  "serde_json",
  "smol",
  "tempfile",
+ "windows-registry 0.6.1",
 ]
 
 [[package]]
diff --git a/Cargo.toml b/Cargo.toml
index 4649b38844..b7acc44c89 100644
--- a/Cargo.toml
+++ b/Cargo.toml
@@ -897,6 +897,7 @@ web-time = "1.1.0"
 webrtc-sys = "0.3.23"
 wgpu = "29.0.4"
 windows-core = "0.61"
+windows-registry = "0.6.0"
 yaml-rust2 = "0.8"
 yawc = { git = "https://github.com/zed-industries/yawc", rev = "71a452f551cac178367eaac5d7418a09afa1f3a2", version = "0.3.3" }
 zeroize = "1.8"
diff --git a/crates/agent/src/thread.rs b/crates/agent/src/thread.rs
index 9b7af8a3d2..25fcb9313e 100644
--- a/crates/agent/src/thread.rs
+++ b/crates/agent/src/thread.rs
@@ -5498,9 +5498,12 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
         let (events_tx, events_rx) = mpsc::unbounded::<Result<ThreadEvent>>();
         let (_cancellation_tx, cancellation_rx) = watch::channel(false);
 
+        // The raw and scoped ids deliberately differ (mirroring
+        // `scoped_tool_call_id`) so that conflating them fails tests instead
+        // of silently passing.
         let stream = ToolCallEventStream::new(
             "test_id".into(),
-            acp::ToolCallId::new("test_id"),
+            acp::ToolCallId::new("0:test_id"),
             ThreadEventStream(events_tx),
             None,
             cancellation_rx,
@@ -5516,9 +5519,12 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
         let (events_tx, events_rx) = mpsc::unbounded::<Result<ThreadEvent>>();
         let (cancellation_tx, cancellation_rx) = watch::channel(false);
 
+        // The raw and scoped ids deliberately differ (mirroring
+        // `scoped_tool_call_id`) so that conflating them fails tests instead
+        // of silently passing.
         let stream = ToolCallEventStream::new(
             "test_id".into(),
-            acp::ToolCallId::new("test_id"),
+            acp::ToolCallId::new("0:test_id"),
             ThreadEventStream(events_tx),
             None,
             cancellation_rx,
@@ -5606,6 +5612,11 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
         &self.tool_use_id
     }
 
+    /// The ACP-facing id for this tool call (see [`scoped_tool_call_id`]).
+    pub fn tool_call_id(&self) -> &acp::ToolCallId {
+        &self.tool_call_id
+    }
+
     pub fn update_fields(&self, fields: acp::ToolCallUpdateFields) {
         self.stream
             .update_tool_call_fields(&self.tool_call_id, fields, None);
@@ -5947,7 +5958,12 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
         ]);
 
         let stream = self.stream.clone();
-        let tool_use_id = self.tool_use_id.clone();
+        // The update must target the ACP-facing (scoped) id: an update keyed
+        // by the raw provider id matches no existing tool call, and creating
+        // one from empty fields is rejected downstream ("title is required"),
+        // which tears down the stream and turns the prompt into a phantom
+        // decline.
+        let tool_call_id = self.tool_call_id.clone();
         cx.spawn(async move |_cx| {
             let (response_tx, response_rx) = oneshot::channel();
             if let Err(error) = stream
@@ -5955,7 +5971,10 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
                 .unbounded_send(Ok(ThreadEvent::ToolCallAuthorization(
                     ToolCallAuthorization {
                         tool_call: acp::ToolCallUpdate::new(
-                            tool_use_id.to_string(),
+                            tool_call_id,
+                            // Leave the title untouched so the card keeps
+                            // showing the command (matching the escalation
+                            // flow).
                             acp::ToolCallUpdateFields::new(),
                         )
                         .meta(acp_thread::meta_with_sandbox_authorization(details)),
@@ -5975,6 +5994,7 @@ impl ToolCallEventStream {
             let outcome = response_rx
                 .await
                 .map_err(|_| anyhow!("authorization channel closed"))?;
+            ensure_tool_call_authorization_not_interrupted(&outcome)?;
             match acp_thread::SandboxPermission::from_id(outcome.option_id.0.as_ref()) {
                 Some(acp_thread::SandboxPermission::AllowOnce) => Ok(()),
                 _ => Err(anyhow!("Windows-drive write aborted by user")),
@@ -8271,6 +8291,41 @@ mod tests {
         assert!(!event_stream.sandbox_fallback_granted_for_thread());
     }
 
+    /// Regression test: the Windows-drive (DrvFs) warning prompt must target
+    /// the ACP-facing *scoped* tool-call id. When it used the raw provider id,
+    /// the update matched no existing tool call, the ACP layer rejected the
+    /// resulting title-less insert ("title is required for a tool call"), the
+    /// event stream was torn down, and every terminal command was auto-declined
+    /// without the user ever seeing a prompt.
+    #[gpui::test]
+    async fn test_windows_fs_warning_targets_scoped_tool_call_id(cx: &mut TestAppContext) {
+        crate::tests::init_test(cx);
+
+        let (event_stream, mut receiver) = ToolCallEventStream::test();
+        let authorize = cx.update(|cx| event_stream.authorize_windows_fs_warning(cx));
+
+        let authorization = receiver.expect_authorization().await;
+        assert_eq!(
+            &authorization.tool_call.tool_call_id,
+            event_stream.tool_call_id(),
+            "the warning prompt must reference the scoped ACP tool-call id, \
+             not the raw provider id"
+        );
+        let details =
+            acp_thread::sandbox_authorization_details_from_meta(&authorization.tool_call.meta)
+                .expect("warning authorization should include sandbox details");
+        assert!(details.warn_windows_fs);
+
+        authorization
+            .response
+            .send(acp_thread::SelectedPermissionOutcome::new(
+                acp::PermissionOptionId::new(acp_thread::SandboxPermission::AllowOnce.as_id()),
+                acp::PermissionOptionKind::AllowOnce,
+            ))
+            .unwrap();
+        authorize.await.unwrap();
+    }
+
     #[test]
     fn test_auto_resolve_permission_outcome_uses_once_only_options() {
         let options = acp_thread::PermissionOptions::Dropdown(vec![
diff --git a/crates/agent/src/tools/terminal_tool.rs b/crates/agent/src/tools/terminal_tool.rs
index 5998153558..97a8566bac 100644
--- a/crates/agent/src/tools/terminal_tool.rs
+++ b/crates/agent/src/tools/terminal_tool.rs
@@ -634,7 +634,19 @@ async fn run_terminal_tool(
     // gate is transient (never persisted): on "Continue" the normal flow
     // (including any escalation prompt) proceeds; on "Abort" the command is
     // cancelled. It recurs until the warning is disabled in settings.
-    if sandboxing && !want_unsandboxed && persistent.warn_ntfs_grants {
+    //
+    // The warning only makes sense when a WSL sandbox will actually wrap the
+    // command, so it is skipped when the command is guaranteed to run without
+    // one (`unsandboxed_floor`: the user already turned the sandbox off for
+    // this thread) and when WSL is structurally absent (no registered distro —
+    // sandbox creation is guaranteed to fail, and the creation-failure
+    // fallback prompt handles that conversation instead).
+    if sandboxing
+        && !want_unsandboxed
+        && !unsandboxed_floor
+        && persistent.warn_ntfs_grants
+        && sandbox::wsl_distro_registered()
+    {
         let effective = event_stream.effective_sandbox_request(&request, &persistent);
         let contains_windows_fs = effective
             .write_paths
@@ -650,15 +662,15 @@ async fn run_terminal_tool(
                         .any(|path| sandbox::path_is_on_windows_drive(path))
             });
         if contains_windows_fs
-            && cx
+            && let Err(error) = cx
                 .update(|cx| event_stream.authorize_windows_fs_warning(cx))
                 .await
-                .is_err()
         {
-            return Ok(
-                "Command cancelled: the user declined to run a command whose sandbox writes to a Windows drive."
-                    .to_string(),
-            );
+            // Carry the underlying error so a prompt-delivery failure is
+            // distinguishable from a genuine user abort.
+            return Ok(format!(
+                "Command cancelled: the user declined to run a command whose sandbox writes to a Windows drive ({error})."
+            ));
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/crates/recent_projects/Cargo.toml b/crates/recent_projects/Cargo.toml
index 99a563aff4..033e47db15 100644
--- a/crates/recent_projects/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/recent_projects/Cargo.toml
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ zed_actions.workspace = true
 indoc.workspace = true
 
 [target.'cfg(target_os = "windows")'.dependencies]
-windows-registry = "0.6.0"
+windows-registry.workspace = true
 
 [dev-dependencies]
 editor = { workspace = true, features = ["test-support"] }
diff --git a/crates/sandbox/Cargo.toml b/crates/sandbox/Cargo.toml
index 3ff373dd8a..a04f7b2bc2 100644
--- a/crates/sandbox/Cargo.toml
+++ b/crates/sandbox/Cargo.toml
@@ -74,3 +74,6 @@ tempfile.workspace = true
 
 [target.'cfg(target_os = "windows")'.dependencies]
 smol.workspace = true
+# Structural WSL-installed check (registered distros under HKCU\...\Lxss)
+# without spawning `wsl.exe`.
+windows-registry.workspace = true
diff --git a/crates/sandbox/src/sandbox.rs b/crates/sandbox/src/sandbox.rs
index 15b3edcec6..866e16a104 100644
--- a/crates/sandbox/src/sandbox.rs
+++ b/crates/sandbox/src/sandbox.rs
@@ -141,6 +141,23 @@ pub fn path_is_on_windows_drive(path: &Path) -> bool {
     }
 }
 
+/// Whether WSL is structurally present (at least one registered distro), via a
+/// cheap registry read with no `wsl.exe` round-trip. Always `false` off
+/// Windows. Suitable only for UI gating (e.g. suppressing DrvFs
+/// sandbox-integrity warnings on machines where no WSL sandbox could ever be
+/// constructed); enforcement paths must keep relying on the real in-WSL probe,
+/// which is authoritative about whether a sandbox can actually be built.
+pub fn wsl_distro_registered() -> bool {
+    #[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
+    {
+        windows_wsl::wsl_distro_registered()
+    }
+    #[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
+    {
+        false
+    }
+}
+
 impl SandboxPolicy {
     /// Combine two policy layers. Filesystem/network grants are unioned into the
     /// least-restrictive policy that satisfies both layers, while protected paths
diff --git a/crates/sandbox/src/windows_wsl.rs b/crates/sandbox/src/windows_wsl.rs
index 32f24c4b48..21158d4f17 100644
--- a/crates/sandbox/src/windows_wsl.rs
+++ b/crates/sandbox/src/windows_wsl.rs
@@ -261,6 +261,28 @@ pub fn path_is_on_windows_drive(path: &Path) -> bool {
     )
 }
 
+/// Whether WSL is structurally present: at least one distro is registered
+/// under `HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Lxss`. A cheap
+/// registry read (no `wsl.exe` spawn), suitable for UI gating decisions like
+/// suppressing sandbox-integrity warnings on machines where no WSL sandbox
+/// could ever be constructed. It is *not* an availability guarantee: a
+/// registered distro can still fail the real environment probe (no `bwrap`,
+/// unhealthy WSL service, …), so enforcement paths must keep relying on
+/// [`probe_environment`]'s in-WSL round-trip.
+pub fn wsl_distro_registered() -> bool {
+    windows_registry::CURRENT_USER
+        .open("Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Lxss")
+        .and_then(|lxss_key| {
+            Ok(lxss_key.keys()?.any(|key| {
+                lxss_key
+                    .open(&key)
+                    .and_then(|distro| distro.get_string("DistributionName"))
+                    .is_ok()
+            }))
+        })
+        .unwrap_or(false)
+}
+
 /// Resolve a requested write grant to the path we persist for it, in
 /// **platform-native** form: a Windows drive path stays `C:\...` (NTFS) and a
 /// WSL path stays a Linux-absolute `/...`. In both cases the path is resolved to