Fixes the bug that made us remove the sandbox.
The bug in question was very dumb:
- there is sophisticated machinery for detecting whether a user-granted
writable path is swapped out for a symlink in the timing gap between
approval and sandbox creation
- there was no equivalent machinery to do the same for the (much larger)
gap between a user *persisting an approval* (either for the current
thread or permanently via settings)
- The fix is essentially to store canonical (i.e. absolute and
symlink-free at all depths) paths as the source of truth, but retain the
raw path for display purposes
- On WSL, there is extra care needed becasue of the bidirectional
mounting (i.e. `/mnt/c/...` and `\\wsl.localhost\Ubuntu\...`). In
particular, `/mnt/c/...` paths, since their inodes do not necessarily
pin NTFS file references, weaken the sandbox guarantees, and so we need
some extra UI to call this out and docs etc...
This also does not remove the feature flag, but just toggles it to
"enabled_for_all"
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: Richard Feldman <oss@rtfeldman.com>
Co-authored-by: Jakub Konka <kubkon@jakubkonka.com>
Co-authored-by: Danilo Leal <daniloleal09@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Closes security loopholes and updates docs:
- installs seccomp filter for blocking naughty syscalls
- tightens macos seatbelt profile
- fetch tool responses that redirect are now constrained by allowed
domains list
Also adds a few "Learn More" buttons that link to the new docs.
Also fixes a bug where the agent would try to create a
`~/.config/zed/AGENTS.md` directory
Also adds unicode confusable detection to URL/path privilege escalation
prompts.
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Removes git sandbox feature
The reason is essentially:
- write access to a `.git` dir can be trivially escalated to unsandboxed
access
- therefore, it is misleading to offer git access separate from
unsandboxed access
- instead, we encourage the model to use `--no-optional-locks` to avoid
needing write access to `git status`, etc.
Adds sandboxing to fetch tool
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Large change to sandboxing:
- fixes a nasty TOCTOU relating to a symlink swap attack, documented in
the `sandboxing/README.md`
- Adds UI and restrictions when in an untrusted workspace
- Adds tests for (soon to be removed) git support
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
Agent terminal sandboxing now protects `.git` metadata by default and
exposes an explicit `allow_git_access` approval. Without it, file
contents of the `.git` directories for opened worktrees and discovered
repositories (including a linked worktree's common `.git`) cannot be
read or written, though their metadata stays visible; when approved,
those Git directories become writable so commands like fetch/commit
work. SSH commit signing keeps working because the inherited
`SSH_AUTH_SOCK` is allowed as local Unix-socket IPC, which does not let
sandboxed commands send network packets to other machines. The Seatbelt
profile also allows PTY terminal-control ioctls so signing/passphrase
prompts can manage terminal state.
This intentionally restricts only `.git` itself (whose location we know
exactly, including the worktree case) rather than
`.gitignore`/`.gitattributes`/`.gitmodules`, since those can be nested
arbitrarily and the goal is to keep the policy expressible as a plain
deny-by-default allowlist that will port to Linux and Windows sandboxes
later.
Closes AI-334
Release Notes:
- Improved agent terminal sandboxing for Git metadata, Git worktrees,
and SSH commit signing.
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: Richard Feldman <oss@rtfeldman.com>
Co-authored-by: Martin Ye <martin@zed.dev>
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Cameron Mcloughlin