Closes security loopholes and updates docs:
- installs seccomp filter for blocking naughty syscalls
- tightens macos seatbelt profile
- fetch tool responses that redirect are now constrained by allowed
domains list
Also adds a few "Learn More" buttons that link to the new docs.
Also fixes a bug where the agent would try to create a
`~/.config/zed/AGENTS.md` directory
Also adds unicode confusable detection to URL/path privilege escalation
prompts.
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Large change to sandboxing:
- fixes a nasty TOCTOU relating to a symlink swap attack, documented in
the `sandboxing/README.md`
- Adds UI and restrictions when in an untrusted workspace
- Adds tests for (soon to be removed) git support
---
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
Summary
- Adds Windows agent terminal sandboxing by routing commands through WSL
and Bubblewrap.
- Supports native Windows and WSL project paths, including elevated
write grants for WSL paths.
- Shows a confirmation prompt to turn off sandboxing when WSL sandbox
setup is unavailable.
This builds on the work in the sandbox-linux branch.
Closes AI-376
Release Notes:
- Added Windows terminal sandboxing for agent commands when sandboxing
is enabled.
---------
Co-authored-by: cameron <cameron.studdstreet@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Richard Feldman <oss@rtfeldman.com>
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Release Notes:
- N/A or Added/Fixed/Improved ...
---------
Co-authored-by: Richard Feldman <oss@rtfeldman.com>
Co-authored-by: Martin Ye <martin@zed.dev>
Co-authored-by: zed-zippy[bot] <234243425+zed-zippy[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds a new `sandbox` crate that wraps shell invocations under macOS's
`sandbox-exec(1)` with a Seatbelt policy built from per-command
permissions:
- Reads are unrestricted.
- Writes are restricted to a caller-provided list of directories (plus
the standard `/dev/*` write targets).
- Network access and unrestricted filesystem writes must be opted into
per command.
`wrap_invocation(program, args, writable_dirs, permissions)` returns the
new program/args plus a `SeatbeltConfigFile` RAII handle that deletes
the on-disk policy file when dropped — callers hold it for the lifetime
of the spawned command.
No callers yet — this is the first of three stacked PRs. The second
wires the sandbox state into the agent's system prompt behind a feature
flag; the third wires the actual wrapping into the agent terminal tool.
The macOS-only dependencies (`tempfile`, `anyhow`) are gated by
`target.'cfg(target_os = "macos")'` so the crate is empty on other
platforms.
Includes 14 tests covering both the generated Seatbelt policy text and
end-to-end behavior (actually invoking `sandbox-exec` and asserting
reads/writes succeed or fail per policy).
Release Notes:
- N/A
