This makes unrestricted sandbox network access an explicit sandbox mode instead of a fallback when the enforcing proxy is unavailable. Host-specific network access still uses the proxy, while approved arbitrary network access skips proxy setup and maps directly to unrestricted egress. Release Notes: - Improved agent terminal sandbox network permission handling. --------- Co-authored-by: Martin Ye <martin@zed.dev> Co-authored-by: MartinYe1234 <52641447+MartinYe1234@users.noreply.github.com>
484 lines
18 KiB
Rust
484 lines
18 KiB
Rust
//! Hostname allowlist for the proxy's policy decisions.
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//!
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//! Patterns are either exact hostnames (`github.com`) or leading-`*.`
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//! subdomain wildcards (`*.example.com` matches `a.example.com` and
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//! `a.b.example.com`, but **not** `example.com` itself — that's the
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//! convention for subdomain wildcards). No middle wildcards, no regex,
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//! no port matching.
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//!
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//! Hostnames are matched case-insensitively (DNS hostnames are case-insensitive
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//! per RFC 1035 §2.3.3) with any trailing dot stripped (so `example.com.` and
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//! `example.com` are equivalent). Internationalized domain names supplied as
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//! UTF-8 are auto-converted to A-label (Punycode) form so callers don't have
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//! to think about it.
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//!
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//! IP literals (IPv4 / IPv6 / `localhost`) are rejected when constructing a
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//! `HostPattern` — hostname-based allowlisting cannot meaningfully apply to
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//! them, and accepting them would be a policy footgun.
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use std::fmt;
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use std::net::IpAddr;
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use thiserror::Error;
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/// A hostname pattern accepted by the allowlist.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
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pub enum HostPattern {
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/// Matches exactly one hostname (case-insensitive, trailing-dot tolerant).
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Exact(String),
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/// Matches subdomains of the contained hostname. `*.example.com` matches
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/// `a.example.com` and `a.b.example.com`, but not `example.com` itself.
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Subdomain(String),
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}
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impl fmt::Display for HostPattern {
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/// Renders the pattern back to its canonical user-facing form. The output
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/// round-trips through [`HostPattern::parse`]: `Exact` prints the bare
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/// hostname, `Subdomain` prints the leading-`*.` wildcard form.
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
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match self {
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HostPattern::Exact(host) => write!(f, "{host}"),
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HostPattern::Subdomain(parent) => write!(f, "*.{parent}"),
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}
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}
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}
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/// Errors returned when parsing a host pattern from a user-provided string.
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#[derive(Debug, Error)]
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pub enum HostPatternError {
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/// The pattern was empty after trimming.
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#[error("host pattern cannot be empty")]
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Empty,
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/// The pattern contained an IP literal (IPv4, IPv6) or a local hostname
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/// (`localhost`, `*.localhost`). Hostname-based allowlisting cannot
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/// meaningfully apply to the local machine.
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#[error(
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"host pattern '{0}' is an IP literal or local hostname; only remote hostnames are allowed"
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)]
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IpLiteral(String),
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/// The pattern contained a wildcard somewhere other than as a leading
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/// label. We support `*.foo.com` but not `foo.*.com`, `*.com`, etc.
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#[error("host pattern '{0}' has a wildcard somewhere other than the leading label")]
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InvalidWildcard(String),
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/// The pattern was syntactically invalid (e.g., empty labels, contained
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/// characters that no IDN-form hostname could contain).
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#[error("host pattern '{pattern}' is not a valid hostname: {reason}")]
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Invalid { pattern: String, reason: String },
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}
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impl HostPattern {
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/// Parse a host pattern from a user-provided string.
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///
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/// Accepts ASCII hostnames or UTF-8 IDN forms (auto-converted to Punycode),
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/// case-insensitively. A leading `*.` indicates a subdomain wildcard.
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/// Trailing dots are stripped.
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///
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/// Rejects IP literals, middle/trailing wildcards, empty labels, and
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/// hostnames `idna` declines to convert.
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pub fn parse(input: &str) -> Result<Self, HostPatternError> {
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let trimmed = input.trim();
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if trimmed.is_empty() {
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return Err(HostPatternError::Empty);
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}
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let (is_subdomain, rest) = if let Some(rest) = trimmed.strip_prefix("*.") {
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(true, rest)
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} else {
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(false, trimmed)
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};
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// Reject any further wildcards. `foo.*.com`, `*.foo.*`, etc.
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if rest.contains('*') {
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return Err(HostPatternError::InvalidWildcard(input.to_string()));
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}
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// Strip a single trailing dot — `example.com.` and `example.com` are
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// the same host. Comment per project convention: hostnames are
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// case-insensitive (RFC 1035 §2.3.3) and trailing-dot tolerant.
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let without_trailing_dot = rest.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(rest);
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if without_trailing_dot.is_empty() {
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return Err(HostPatternError::Empty);
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}
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// IDN auto-conversion to Punycode (A-labels). For pure-ASCII inputs
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// this is a no-op; for UTF-8 it produces the `xn--` form that TLS
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// SNI and HTTP `Host:` headers actually carry over the wire.
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let ascii =
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idna::domain_to_ascii(without_trailing_dot).map_err(|e| HostPatternError::Invalid {
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pattern: input.to_string(),
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reason: format!("idna conversion failed: {e}"),
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})?;
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if ascii.is_empty() {
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return Err(HostPatternError::Empty);
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}
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// Reject IP literals (v4 and v6) so that hostname-based allowlisting
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// can't be subverted by listing an IP. IPv6 literals in hostname
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// contexts arrive bracketed (`[::1]`); we strip the brackets before
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// checking.
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let ip_check_input = ascii
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.strip_prefix('[')
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.and_then(|s| s.strip_suffix(']'))
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.unwrap_or(&ascii);
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if ip_check_input.parse::<IpAddr>().is_ok() {
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return Err(HostPatternError::IpLiteral(input.to_string()));
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}
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// Final sanity: no empty labels (`foo..bar`), no leading/trailing
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// dots after our strip-trailing-dot step.
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if ascii.starts_with('.') || ascii.ends_with('.') || ascii.contains("..") {
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return Err(HostPatternError::Invalid {
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pattern: input.to_string(),
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reason: "empty label".to_string(),
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});
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}
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// `idna` lowercases ASCII labels for us; lowercasing again here is a
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// safety net and a comment that case-insensitive matching is the
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// model.
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let canonical = ascii.to_ascii_lowercase();
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// `localhost` (and the whole `.localhost` special-use domain, which
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// resolvers treat as loopback per RFC 6761) isn't an IP literal but
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// is treated like one for the purposes of network policy: nothing
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// about a "hostname allowlist" makes sense for loopback names, and
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// allowing them would punch a hole through the proxy back into the
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// host machine.
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if canonical == "localhost" || canonical.ends_with(".localhost") {
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return Err(HostPatternError::IpLiteral(input.to_string()));
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}
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Ok(if is_subdomain {
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HostPattern::Subdomain(canonical)
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} else {
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HostPattern::Exact(canonical)
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})
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}
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/// Returns true if this pattern matches the given hostname. The hostname
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/// should already be in ASCII (Punycode) form — that's how it arrives in
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/// `CONNECT`/`Host:` lines on the wire.
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pub fn matches(&self, host: &str) -> bool {
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// Hostnames are case-insensitive (RFC 1035 §2.3.3) and trailing-dot
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// tolerant.
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let canonical = host.strip_suffix('.').unwrap_or(host).to_ascii_lowercase();
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match self {
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HostPattern::Exact(pattern) => canonical == *pattern,
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HostPattern::Subdomain(parent) => {
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// `*.example.com` matches `a.example.com` and `a.b.example.com`
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// but **not** `example.com` itself. Some tools include the
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// bare parent in subdomain wildcards; we don't, by design.
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canonical
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.strip_suffix(parent.as_str())
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.map(|prefix| prefix.ends_with('.') && !prefix.is_empty())
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.unwrap_or(false)
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}
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}
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}
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/// Returns true if granting this pattern subsumes granting `other` — i.e.
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/// every host `other` would permit is also permitted by `self`.
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///
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/// This is the host-pattern analogue of filesystem subtree containment,
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/// used to decide whether an already-granted network permission covers a
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/// newly requested one (so the user isn't re-prompted). Examples:
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///
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/// - `github.com` covers `github.com` (identical).
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/// - `*.github.com` covers `api.github.com` and `*.api.github.com`.
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/// - `*.github.com` does **not** cover `github.com` (the bare parent is
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/// not a subdomain), and a narrower grant never covers a broader one.
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pub fn covers(&self, other: &HostPattern) -> bool {
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match (self, other) {
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(HostPattern::Exact(a), HostPattern::Exact(b)) => a == b,
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// An exact grant can only cover that one host, never a wildcard.
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(HostPattern::Exact(_), HostPattern::Subdomain(_)) => false,
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(HostPattern::Subdomain(parent), HostPattern::Exact(host)) => {
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is_subdomain_of(host, parent)
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}
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(HostPattern::Subdomain(parent), HostPattern::Subdomain(child)) => {
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child == parent || is_subdomain_of(child, parent)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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/// Whether `host` is a strict subdomain of `parent`. Both are expected to be
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/// in canonical form (lowercase, no trailing dot), as produced by
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/// [`HostPattern::parse`]. `is_subdomain_of("a.example.com", "example.com")`
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/// is true; `is_subdomain_of("example.com", "example.com")` is false.
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fn is_subdomain_of(host: &str, parent: &str) -> bool {
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host.strip_suffix(parent)
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.and_then(|prefix| prefix.strip_suffix('.'))
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.is_some_and(|label| !label.is_empty())
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}
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/// Set of host patterns. Construct with `Allowlist::from_patterns` or via
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/// `FromIterator<HostPattern>`.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
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pub struct Allowlist {
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patterns: Vec<HostPattern>,
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/// When true, every host is allowed regardless of `patterns`. The proxy
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/// still observes traffic and emits events; it just doesn't deny.
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allow_any: bool,
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}
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impl Allowlist {
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/// An allowlist that denies everything. Equivalent to `Allowlist::default()`.
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pub fn empty() -> Self {
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Self::default()
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}
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/// An allowlist that allows any host. When used with the proxy, traffic is
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/// still observed, but no host policy check is applied.
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pub fn any() -> Self {
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Self {
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patterns: Vec::new(),
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allow_any: true,
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}
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}
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/// Build from an iterator of patterns.
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pub fn from_patterns<I: IntoIterator<Item = HostPattern>>(patterns: I) -> Self {
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Self {
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patterns: patterns.into_iter().collect(),
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allow_any: false,
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}
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}
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/// Returns `true` if the host should be allowed through.
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pub fn allows(&self, host: &str) -> bool {
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if self.allow_any {
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return true;
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}
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self.patterns.iter().any(|p| p.matches(host))
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}
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/// Patterns in this allowlist (for diagnostics / system prompt rendering).
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pub fn patterns(&self) -> &[HostPattern] {
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&self.patterns
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}
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/// Whether this allowlist permits any host without a policy check.
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pub fn allows_any(&self) -> bool {
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self.allow_any
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}
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/// Whether this allowlist denies every host — i.e. it grants nothing,
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/// so no network plumbing is needed at all.
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pub fn is_deny_all(&self) -> bool {
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!self.allow_any && self.patterns.is_empty()
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}
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}
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impl FromIterator<HostPattern> for Allowlist {
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fn from_iter<I: IntoIterator<Item = HostPattern>>(iter: I) -> Self {
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Self::from_patterns(iter)
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn parse_exact_hostname() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(p, HostPattern::Exact("github.com".into()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_is_case_insensitive() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("GitHub.COM").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(p, HostPattern::Exact("github.com".into()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_strips_trailing_dot() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("example.com.").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(p, HostPattern::Exact("example.com".into()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_subdomain_wildcard() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("*.example.com").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(p, HostPattern::Subdomain("example.com".into()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_idn_to_punycode() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("münchen.de").unwrap();
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assert_eq!(p, HostPattern::Exact("xn--mnchen-3ya.de".into()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_rejects_empty() {
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assert!(matches!(
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HostPattern::parse("").unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::Empty
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));
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assert!(matches!(
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HostPattern::parse(" ").unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::Empty
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));
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assert!(matches!(
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HostPattern::parse("*.").unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::Empty
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));
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_rejects_ip_literals() {
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for ip in ["1.2.3.4", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "::1", "[::1]", "fe80::1"] {
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assert!(
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matches!(
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HostPattern::parse(ip).unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::IpLiteral(_)
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),
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"expected IpLiteral for {ip}"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_rejects_localhost() {
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// The whole `.localhost` special-use domain is loopback per RFC 6761,
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// not just the bare name.
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for pattern in [
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"localhost",
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"LOCALHOST",
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"localhost.",
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"foo.localhost",
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"*.localhost",
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"a.b.localhost",
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] {
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assert!(
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matches!(
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HostPattern::parse(pattern).unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::IpLiteral(_)
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),
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"expected IpLiteral for {pattern}"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_rejects_middle_wildcards() {
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for pat in ["foo.*.com", "*.foo.*", "*.*", "foo.*"] {
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assert!(
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matches!(
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HostPattern::parse(pat).unwrap_err(),
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HostPatternError::InvalidWildcard(_)
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),
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"expected InvalidWildcard for {pat}"
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);
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}
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}
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#[test]
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fn parse_rejects_empty_labels() {
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let err = HostPattern::parse("foo..bar").unwrap_err();
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assert!(matches!(err, HostPatternError::Invalid { .. }));
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}
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#[test]
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fn matches_exact_is_case_insensitive() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap();
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assert!(p.matches("github.com"));
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assert!(p.matches("GITHUB.COM"));
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assert!(p.matches("GitHub.com"));
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assert!(p.matches("github.com.")); // trailing dot
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assert!(!p.matches("example.com"));
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assert!(!p.matches("a.github.com")); // exact does not match subdomains
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}
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#[test]
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fn matches_subdomain_wildcard() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("*.example.com").unwrap();
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assert!(p.matches("a.example.com"));
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assert!(p.matches("a.b.example.com"));
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assert!(p.matches("A.B.EXAMPLE.COM"));
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// `*.example.com` does NOT match the bare parent.
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assert!(!p.matches("example.com"));
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// Sibling not a subdomain.
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assert!(!p.matches("notexample.com"));
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assert!(!p.matches("malicious-example.com"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn matches_idn_via_punycode() {
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let p = HostPattern::parse("münchen.de").unwrap();
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assert!(p.matches("xn--mnchen-3ya.de"));
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// Hosts arrive on the wire as Punycode, so we don't try to match the
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// UTF-8 form. Just make sure that path works.
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}
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#[test]
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fn allowlist_allows_member() {
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let list = Allowlist::from_patterns(vec![
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HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap(),
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HostPattern::parse("*.npmjs.org").unwrap(),
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]);
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assert!(list.allows("github.com"));
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assert!(list.allows("registry.npmjs.org"));
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assert!(!list.allows("example.com"));
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assert!(!list.allows("npmjs.org")); // bare parent doesn't match wildcard
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}
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#[test]
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fn empty_allowlist_denies_everything() {
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let list = Allowlist::empty();
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assert!(!list.allows("anything.com"));
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}
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#[test]
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fn any_allowlist_allows_everything() {
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let list = Allowlist::any();
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assert!(list.allows("anything.com"));
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assert!(list.allows("evil.org"));
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assert!(list.allows("a.b.c.d.e"));
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assert!(list.allows_any());
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}
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#[test]
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fn display_round_trips_through_parse() {
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for input in ["github.com", "*.example.com", "xn--mnchen-3ya.de"] {
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let pattern = HostPattern::parse(input).unwrap();
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let rendered = pattern.to_string();
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assert_eq!(HostPattern::parse(&rendered).unwrap(), pattern);
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}
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assert_eq!(
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HostPattern::parse("GitHub.com").unwrap().to_string(),
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"github.com"
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);
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assert_eq!(
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HostPattern::parse("*.NPMJS.org").unwrap().to_string(),
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"*.npmjs.org"
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn covers_exact_only_matches_identical() {
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let github = HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap();
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assert!(github.covers(&HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap()));
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assert!(!github.covers(&HostPattern::parse("api.github.com").unwrap()));
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assert!(!github.covers(&HostPattern::parse("*.github.com").unwrap()));
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assert!(!github.covers(&HostPattern::parse("example.com").unwrap()));
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}
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#[test]
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fn covers_subdomain_wildcard_subsumes_descendants() {
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let wildcard = HostPattern::parse("*.github.com").unwrap();
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// Covers exact subdomains, at any depth.
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assert!(wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("api.github.com").unwrap()));
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assert!(wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("a.b.github.com").unwrap()));
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// Covers narrower wildcards.
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assert!(wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("*.api.github.com").unwrap()));
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assert!(wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("*.github.com").unwrap()));
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// Does NOT cover the bare parent or unrelated hosts.
|
|
assert!(!wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("github.com").unwrap()));
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|
assert!(!wildcard.covers(&HostPattern::parse("notgithub.com").unwrap()));
|
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// A narrower wildcard does not cover a broader one.
|
|
let narrow = HostPattern::parse("*.api.github.com").unwrap();
|
|
assert!(!narrow.covers(&HostPattern::parse("*.github.com").unwrap()));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|