Follow-up to the terminal permission params refactor, addressing @benbrandt's [review feedback](https://github.com/zed-industries/zed/pull/51782#pullrequestreview-2926899804) about string formatting leaking into the UI layer. ## Changes ### Outcome construction moved to acp_thread - Added `PermissionOptionChoice::build_outcome(is_allow)` — builds a `SelectedPermissionOutcome` from a choice, attaching `SelectedPermissionParams::Terminal` when the choice carries `sub_patterns`. - Added `PermissionOptions::build_outcome_for_checked_patterns(checked_indices, is_allow)` — handles the `DropdownWithPatterns` per-command checklist flow, returning `None` when zero patterns are checked (degrading to once). The UI's `authorize_with_granularity` no longer does any `format!("always_allow:{}",...)` string formatting or `SelectedPermissionParams` construction. ### `option_kind` folded into `SelectedPermissionOutcome` `SelectedPermissionOutcome` now carries `option_kind: acp::PermissionOptionKind`, eliminating the separate parameter that was threaded through the entire `authorize_tool_call` chain: ``` ThreadView::authorize_tool_call → Conversation::authorize_tool_call → AcpThread::authorize_tool_call ``` Every signature in this chain dropped one parameter. ### `SelectedPermissionParams` removed from UI imports The type is now only referenced by `acp_thread` (construction) and `agent` (consumption). The UI passes `SelectedPermissionOutcome` opaquely. Release Notes: - N/A
450 lines
15 KiB
Rust
450 lines
15 KiB
Rust
use super::tool_permissions::{
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SensitiveSettingsKind, authorize_symlink_access, canonicalize_worktree_roots,
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detect_symlink_escape, sensitive_settings_kind,
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};
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use agent_client_protocol::ToolKind;
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use agent_settings::AgentSettings;
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use futures::FutureExt as _;
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use gpui::{App, Entity, SharedString, Task};
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use project::Project;
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use schemars::JsonSchema;
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use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
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use settings::Settings;
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use std::sync::Arc;
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use util::markdown::MarkdownInlineCode;
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use crate::{
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AgentTool, ToolCallEventStream, ToolInput, ToolPermissionDecision, decide_permission_for_path,
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};
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use std::path::Path;
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/// Creates a new directory at the specified path within the project. Returns confirmation that the directory was created.
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///
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/// This tool creates a directory and all necessary parent directories. It should be used whenever you need to create new directories within the project.
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#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, JsonSchema)]
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pub struct CreateDirectoryToolInput {
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/// The path of the new directory.
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///
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/// <example>
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/// If the project has the following structure:
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///
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/// - directory1/
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/// - directory2/
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///
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/// You can create a new directory by providing a path of "directory1/new_directory"
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/// </example>
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pub path: String,
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}
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pub struct CreateDirectoryTool {
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project: Entity<Project>,
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}
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impl CreateDirectoryTool {
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pub fn new(project: Entity<Project>) -> Self {
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Self { project }
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}
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}
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impl AgentTool for CreateDirectoryTool {
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type Input = CreateDirectoryToolInput;
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type Output = String;
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const NAME: &'static str = "create_directory";
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fn kind() -> ToolKind {
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ToolKind::Read
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}
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fn initial_title(
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&self,
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input: Result<Self::Input, serde_json::Value>,
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_cx: &mut App,
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) -> SharedString {
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if let Ok(input) = input {
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format!("Create directory {}", MarkdownInlineCode(&input.path)).into()
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} else {
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"Create directory".into()
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}
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}
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fn run(
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self: Arc<Self>,
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input: ToolInput<Self::Input>,
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event_stream: ToolCallEventStream,
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cx: &mut App,
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) -> Task<Result<Self::Output, Self::Output>> {
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let project = self.project.clone();
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cx.spawn(async move |cx| {
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let input = input
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.recv()
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.await
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.map_err(|e| format!("Failed to receive tool input: {e}"))?;
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let decision = cx.update(|cx| {
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decide_permission_for_path(Self::NAME, &input.path, AgentSettings::get_global(cx))
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});
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if let ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(reason) = decision {
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return Err(reason);
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}
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let destination_path: Arc<str> = input.path.as_str().into();
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let fs = project.read_with(cx, |project, _cx| project.fs().clone());
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let canonical_roots = canonicalize_worktree_roots(&project, &fs, cx).await;
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let symlink_escape_target = project.read_with(cx, |project, cx| {
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detect_symlink_escape(project, &input.path, &canonical_roots, cx)
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.map(|(_, target)| target)
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});
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let sensitive_kind = sensitive_settings_kind(Path::new(&input.path), fs.as_ref()).await;
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let decision =
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if matches!(decision, ToolPermissionDecision::Allow) && sensitive_kind.is_some() {
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ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm
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} else {
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decision
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};
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let authorize = if let Some(canonical_target) = symlink_escape_target {
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// Symlink escape authorization replaces (rather than supplements)
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// the normal tool-permission prompt. The symlink prompt already
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// requires explicit user approval with the canonical target shown,
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// which is strictly more security-relevant than a generic confirm.
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Some(cx.update(|cx| {
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authorize_symlink_access(
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Self::NAME,
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&input.path,
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&canonical_target,
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&event_stream,
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cx,
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)
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}))
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} else {
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match decision {
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ToolPermissionDecision::Allow => None,
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ToolPermissionDecision::Confirm => Some(cx.update(|cx| {
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let title = format!("Create directory {}", MarkdownInlineCode(&input.path));
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let title = match &sensitive_kind {
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Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Local) => {
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format!("{title} (local settings)")
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}
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Some(SensitiveSettingsKind::Global) => format!("{title} (settings)"),
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None => title,
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};
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let context =
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crate::ToolPermissionContext::new(Self::NAME, vec![input.path.clone()]);
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event_stream.authorize(title, context, cx)
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})),
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ToolPermissionDecision::Deny(_) => None,
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}
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};
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if let Some(authorize) = authorize {
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authorize.await.map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
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}
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let create_entry = project.update(cx, |project, cx| {
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match project.find_project_path(&input.path, cx) {
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Some(project_path) => Ok(project.create_entry(project_path, true, cx)),
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None => Err("Path to create was outside the project".to_string()),
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}
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})?;
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futures::select! {
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result = create_entry.fuse() => {
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result.map_err(|e| format!("Creating directory {destination_path}: {e}"))?;
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}
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_ = event_stream.cancelled_by_user().fuse() => {
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return Err("Create directory cancelled by user".to_string());
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}
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}
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Ok(format!("Created directory {destination_path}"))
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})
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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use agent_client_protocol as acp;
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use fs::Fs as _;
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use gpui::TestAppContext;
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use project::{FakeFs, Project};
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use serde_json::json;
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use settings::SettingsStore;
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use std::path::PathBuf;
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use util::path;
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use crate::ToolCallEventStream;
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fn init_test(cx: &mut TestAppContext) {
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cx.update(|cx| {
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let settings_store = SettingsStore::test(cx);
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cx.set_global(settings_store);
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});
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cx.update(|cx| {
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let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone();
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settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Allow;
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AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx);
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});
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}
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#[gpui::test]
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async fn test_create_directory_symlink_escape_requests_authorization(cx: &mut TestAppContext) {
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init_test(cx);
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let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor());
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fs.insert_tree(
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path!("/root"),
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json!({
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"project": {
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"src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" }
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},
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"external": {
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"data": { "file.txt": "content" }
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}
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}),
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)
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.await;
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fs.create_symlink(
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path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(),
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PathBuf::from("../external"),
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)
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.await
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.unwrap();
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let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await;
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cx.executor().run_until_parked();
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let tool = Arc::new(CreateDirectoryTool::new(project));
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let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test();
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let task = cx.update(|cx| {
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tool.run(
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ToolInput::resolved(CreateDirectoryToolInput {
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path: "project/link_to_external".into(),
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}),
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event_stream,
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cx,
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)
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});
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let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await;
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let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
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assert!(
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title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"),
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"Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}",
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);
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auth.response
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.send(acp_thread::SelectedPermissionOutcome::new(
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acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow"),
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acp::PermissionOptionKind::AllowOnce,
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))
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.unwrap();
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let result = task.await;
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assert!(
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result.is_ok(),
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"Tool should succeed after authorization: {result:?}"
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);
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}
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#[gpui::test]
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async fn test_create_directory_symlink_escape_denied(cx: &mut TestAppContext) {
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init_test(cx);
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let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor());
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fs.insert_tree(
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path!("/root"),
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json!({
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"project": {
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"src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" }
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},
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"external": {
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"data": { "file.txt": "content" }
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}
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}),
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)
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.await;
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fs.create_symlink(
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path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(),
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PathBuf::from("../external"),
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)
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.await
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.unwrap();
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let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await;
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cx.executor().run_until_parked();
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let tool = Arc::new(CreateDirectoryTool::new(project));
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let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test();
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let task = cx.update(|cx| {
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tool.run(
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ToolInput::resolved(CreateDirectoryToolInput {
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path: "project/link_to_external".into(),
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}),
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event_stream,
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cx,
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)
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});
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let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await;
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drop(auth);
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let result = task.await;
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assert!(
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result.is_err(),
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"Tool should fail when authorization is denied"
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);
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}
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#[gpui::test]
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async fn test_create_directory_symlink_escape_confirm_requires_single_approval(
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cx: &mut TestAppContext,
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) {
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init_test(cx);
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cx.update(|cx| {
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let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone();
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settings.tool_permissions.default = settings::ToolPermissionMode::Confirm;
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AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx);
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});
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let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor());
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fs.insert_tree(
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path!("/root"),
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json!({
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"project": {
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"src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" }
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},
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"external": {
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"data": { "file.txt": "content" }
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}
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}),
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)
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.await;
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fs.create_symlink(
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path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(),
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PathBuf::from("../external"),
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)
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.await
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.unwrap();
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let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await;
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cx.executor().run_until_parked();
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let tool = Arc::new(CreateDirectoryTool::new(project));
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let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test();
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let task = cx.update(|cx| {
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tool.run(
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ToolInput::resolved(CreateDirectoryToolInput {
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path: "project/link_to_external".into(),
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}),
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event_stream,
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cx,
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)
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});
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let auth = event_rx.expect_authorization().await;
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let title = auth.tool_call.fields.title.as_deref().unwrap_or("");
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assert!(
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title.contains("points outside the project") || title.contains("symlink"),
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"Authorization title should mention symlink escape, got: {title}",
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);
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auth.response
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.send(acp_thread::SelectedPermissionOutcome::new(
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acp::PermissionOptionId::new("allow"),
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acp::PermissionOptionKind::AllowOnce,
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))
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.unwrap();
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assert!(
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!matches!(
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event_rx.try_next(),
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Ok(Some(Ok(crate::ThreadEvent::ToolCallAuthorization(_))))
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),
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"Expected a single authorization prompt",
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);
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let result = task.await;
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assert!(
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result.is_ok(),
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"Tool should succeed after one authorization: {result:?}"
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);
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}
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#[gpui::test]
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async fn test_create_directory_symlink_escape_honors_deny_policy(cx: &mut TestAppContext) {
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init_test(cx);
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cx.update(|cx| {
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let mut settings = AgentSettings::get_global(cx).clone();
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settings.tool_permissions.tools.insert(
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"create_directory".into(),
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agent_settings::ToolRules {
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default: Some(settings::ToolPermissionMode::Deny),
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..Default::default()
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},
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);
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AgentSettings::override_global(settings, cx);
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});
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let fs = FakeFs::new(cx.executor());
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fs.insert_tree(
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path!("/root"),
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json!({
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"project": {
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"src": { "main.rs": "fn main() {}" }
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},
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"external": {
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"data": { "file.txt": "content" }
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}
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}),
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)
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.await;
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fs.create_symlink(
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path!("/root/project/link_to_external").as_ref(),
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PathBuf::from("../external"),
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)
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.await
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.unwrap();
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let project = Project::test(fs.clone(), [path!("/root/project").as_ref()], cx).await;
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cx.executor().run_until_parked();
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let tool = Arc::new(CreateDirectoryTool::new(project));
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let (event_stream, mut event_rx) = ToolCallEventStream::test();
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let result = cx
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.update(|cx| {
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tool.run(
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ToolInput::resolved(CreateDirectoryToolInput {
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path: "project/link_to_external".into(),
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}),
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event_stream,
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cx,
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)
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})
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.await;
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assert!(result.is_err(), "Tool should fail when policy denies");
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assert!(
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!matches!(
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event_rx.try_next(),
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Ok(Some(Ok(crate::ThreadEvent::ToolCallAuthorization(_))))
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),
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"Deny policy should not emit symlink authorization prompt",
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);
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}
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}
|